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Putting the ‘‘Con’’ into Constitutions: The Economics
of Prison Gangs
David Skarbek*
George Mason University
This paper investigates the internal governance institutions of criminal enterprise
by examining the law, economics, and organization of the La Nuestra Familia
prison gang. To organize effectively within the confines of penitentiaries, the gang
needs to provide a credible commitment for member safety to potential entrants
and a means of preventing predation and misconduct within the gang. I analyze
the governance structure outlined in the gang’s written constitution and show
how it solves the collective action problems associated with multilevel criminal
enterprises. (JEL D23, K42, L23, P16)
If I go forward, follow me.
If I hesitate, push me.
If I am killed, avenge me.
If I am a traitor, kill me.
(from the membership oath of La Nuestra Familia)
1. Introduction
The California-based prison gang, La Nuestra Familia, uses violence to proﬁt
from illicit activities inside and outside of prison. Although one of the most
ruthless, it is also one of the most regimented prison gangs in California, lead-
ing a former federal prosecutor to describe their organization as being as so-
phisticated as a Fortune 500 company (Hunt et al. 1993: 399; 60 Minutes
2005).
Criminal enterprises face organizational problems that legitimate ﬁrms do
not. Most importantly, due the illegal nature of their activities, organized crime
cannot rely on state enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights.
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The safety and property of the members themselves are not secure. Like many
other manifestations of organized crime, the Nuestra Familia (NF) prison gang
requires members to join for life. When exit from a criminal organization is
prohibitively costly, there is a potential for criminal leaders to abuse their au-
thority. Organizations that require lifelong commitment by members must as-
sure them that this power will not be abused. Just as government can predate on
its own citizens—what Weingast deems the ‘‘fundamental political problem’’
(1995)—so can gangs predate on its own members. Empowering a leadership
authority to organize and manage the pursuit of criminal proﬁts requires also
compelling it to constrain itself.
Organized crime takes many different forms. Some organizations provide
goods to voluntary consumers (such as narcotics, gambling, and prostitution
services) and others seek to gain the beneﬁts from coordinating coercion,
thievery, and physical violence against unwilling victims (home invasion rob-
beries, burglary, and murder). Past research has deﬁned organized crime by the
monopoly control of a market (Schelling 1971), an organizational hierarchy
and engagement in multiple criminal activities (Reuter 1983), and by the par-
ticular goods and services an organization provides (Task Force on Organized
Crime 1967). This article avoids these narrow deﬁnitions of organized crime
and instead adopts the more general deﬁnition of organized crime as ‘‘any
long-term arrangement between multiple criminals that requires coordination
and involves agreements that, owing to their illicit status, cannot be enforced
by the state’’ (Leeson 2007a: 1052).
Since Becker’s seminal article (1968), economists have developed several
distinct lines of research on crime, focusing mainly on its economic impact,
policing it, and the factors that lead to it. Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) pro-
vide an excellent collection of essays focused speciﬁcally on the economics
of organized crime (See also Anderson 1979; Reuter 1983; 1987; Jennings
1984; Arlacchi 1986; Jankowski 1991; Dick 1995; Konrad and Skaperdas
1998; Garoupa 2000; Skaperdas 2001, Chang et al. 2005; Sobel and Osoba
2008).
Despite the growing literature on these topics, few economists have
researched the governance institutions of organized crime and the potential
for predation. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) come close in their eye-opening
examination of the ﬁnances of a Chicago street gang, though their focus is
on identifying the monetary incentives of intragroup organization. Reuter
(1983) examines the markets that the New York Italian Maﬁa served, but
he focuses primarily on how the group interacts with nongroup members. Leeson
(2007a) identiﬁes the problem of internal predation in the context of
17th and 18th century pirates, and he shows that sailors relied on written con-
stitutions to coordinate control of predation by captains.1 Leeson’s historical
account provides a fascinating look at the mechanisms deployed to manage
intragroup conﬂict. This article examines the predation problem in a modern
1. Leeson (2008a, 2008b, 2008d) discusses the ‘‘pirationality’’ behind numerous other pirate
practices.
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context—prison gangs—and identiﬁes the efﬁcient governance institutions
that arise in a contemporary environment.
Organized criminal enterprises often act as quasi-governments, protecting
property rights and enforcing contracts when legitimate governments are not
capable or willing to do so (Anderson 1979; Baumol 1995; Skaperdas and
Syropoulos 1995). Skaperdas (2001) surveys the historical experiences of or-
ganized crime in several countries and concludes that it arises in power vac-
uums to ﬁll the need for property protection. Gambetta’s (1993) detailed study
shows that the Sicilian Maﬁa primarily provided businesses with private pro-
tection services when the government was unable to. Sobel and Osoba (2008)
ﬁnd empirically that membership in Los Angeles street gangs are a response to
violence rather than precipitating it, suggesting that members join to protect
themselves when the legitimate government does not.2
Both organized crime and legitimate governments wield a monopolistic con-
trol over coercion, so both groups’ members face the problem of internal pre-
dation. Sutter notes the difﬁculty of constraining predation: ‘‘delegating a near
monopoly on the means of coercion to government creates potentially serious
agency problems’’ (1997: 140). He identiﬁes ﬁve problems with enforcing con-
stitutional constraints. First, it is costly to detect violations. Second, complicated
constitutions require assurances about the sincerity of interpretation on the part
of experts. Third, once violations are detected, there must be mechanisms in
place for preventing or correcting them. Fourth, limiting constitutional viola-
tions is a public good, so people have a tendency to free ride on its provision.
Fifth, people may have difﬁculty coordinating enforcement. Solving these ﬁve
problems is required for the successful enforcement of constitutional constraints.
Understanding the mechanisms used to overcome these problems in the con-
text of organized crime has been difﬁcult because researchers do not have access
to information about the actual internal workings of organized crime. Naturally,
criminals are hesitant to provide incriminating information to researchers that
could subsequently become available to law enforcement ofﬁcials. This article
overcomes the problem of ‘‘getting inside’’ by examining a prison gang’s written
constitution, which gives a detailed outline of the formal rules by which the or-
ganization operates, and thus provides a unique look into the internal governance
of organized crime. The constitution is reprinted in Fuentes (2006) and described
in Lewis (1980), Hunt et al. (1993), as well as the ‘‘La Nuestra Familia’’ ﬁle
provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. In addition, information about the operation of the prison gang is
obtained by examining a collection of documents, including Federal Grand Jury
testimony, court documents, internal police reports, and the personal correspon-
dence and documents of a NF leader-turned-informant.
This article shows that the NF prison gang solves the internal predation
problem by credibly committing safety to potential members and controlling
2. Research on the role of gangs as quasi-governments is connected more broadly to a theo-
retical and empirical literature on self-governance (Benson 1990; Leeson 2007b; 2008c; 2008e;
Stringham 2007; Powell et al. 2008).
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subordinates in dispersed, hierarchical institutions with a system of checks and
balances. These mechanisms are successful because they provide each mem-
ber of the gang with the ability to monitor predation, an incentive to stop it, and
a mechanism for doing so.3
The article is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the history and basic
governance structure of the gang. Section 3 models the predation problem
faced by a multilevel organization. Section 4 examines the speciﬁc governance
institutions the gang uses to overcome the collective action problem of limiting
predation and misconduct. Section 5 concludes.
2. The History and Organizational Structure of NF
NF is a highly organized criminal enterprise that began in California prisons
and has spread beyond the walls into Northern California neighborhoods and
correctional facilities in other states (Koehler 2000; Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation 2008: 10). In the mid-1960s, they formed in Soledad State Prison to
protect themselves from belligerence by The Mexican Maﬁa prison gang
(California Department of Justice 2003: 15). The Mexican Maﬁa had been
‘‘in charge of every drug transaction and prison pleasure’’ as well as, victim-
izing Hispanic inmates, who could not ‘‘safely take showers’’ and had their
guests harassed during visiting hours (Fuentes 2006: Introduction). As an in-
dication of their presence, in 1972, the Mexican Maﬁa committed 30 out of
36 murders in the California prison system (Gaes et al. 2002: 360).
Membership in the Mexican Maﬁa, however, often did not guarantee
an inmate’s safety and internal predation occurred regularly.Mexicanmaﬁa lead-
ers ‘‘. . . forced some of their own members to pay rent for their assigned cells . . .
[and] members in other prisons had similar complaints of extortion and
abuse. Many came to the horrible realization that membership provided little
advantage’’ (Fuentes 2006: Introduction). A letter written by one NF leader
to another states that ‘‘Those who seek to destroy and undermine our raza’s
[people’s] efforts to rise above their standards of living have through their
own actions made it possible for us and other groups like us to come together’’
(Fuentes 2006: 37).4 NF formed to counter the Mexican Maﬁa’s abuse.
3. Identifying the mechanisms used sheds light on criminal enterprise more generally and to
noncriminal organizations with self-governing institutions. For example, Radford (1945) relays his
experience with the economic organization of a P.O.W. Camp where he argues that exchanges,
once appropriately modiﬁed for the abnormal environment, appear fully rational and similar to
traditional markets. By understanding the economy in these camps, Radford illuminates aspects
of more traditional markets.
4. Fuentes (2006) recounts the life of Robert Gratton, who was, at one time, the third highest
ranking member of NF. He testiﬁed in Operation Black Widow, a federal case against NF and
joined theWitness Protection Program. AlthoughNina Fuentes is listed as author, a news interview
of Gratton in 2003 indicates that he was writing an autobiography of the same title (Berton 2003).
The publisher conﬁrmed in personal correspondence ‘‘Mr. Gratton was heavily involved with the
project.’’ This book, then, provides a unique source of documents, personal correspondence, and
perspective about NF governance institutions.
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Rural Northern California Hispanics grouped together and formed the
Blooming Flower, which later changed its name to La Nuestra Familia.
Started largely by incarcerated Vietnam veterans, NF developed a military-
style hierarchical structure (Nuestra Familia, Our Familia 2007)5. One
prominent member, Robert ‘‘Babo’’ Sosa, already recognized as the NF
leader, became the ﬁrst General Elect. Once in charge, Sosa ‘‘drafted a very
sophisticated constitution with objectives and bylaws’’ (Fuentes 2006: 3).
The organization recruited members, in part, with promises that unlike
the Mexican Maﬁa, they would not abuse their newly inherited authority
(Fuentes 2006: 19). The rhetoric surrounding the formation of the organiza-
tion was to obtain unity and equality, to be the ‘‘voice of the people through-
out the prison system’’ (Fuentes 2006: 11). Private correspondence between
two incarcerated NF leaders illustrates the rhetoric typical of the group:
‘‘[the governing council] have remained loyal to the mob, as well as to
the people, because the people put them there and can vote them out’’
(Fuentes 2006: 186).
In 1977, a report to the California Senate by the Subcommittee on Civil
Disorder reported that NF is the ‘‘second most populous and powerful orga-
nization in the prison system’’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2008: 13).
Estimates of membership range from 400 to 600 incarcerated members; in ad-
dition, there are more than 1000 ‘‘associates,’’ who though not permanent
members, assist in NF activities inside and outside of prison (Lewis 1980:
133; Fuentes 2006: 297).
NF’s governance structure is found in their constitution, titled ‘‘The Su-
preme Power Structure of La Nuestra Familia’’ (reproduced in the Appendix).
One NF member states ‘‘It was like the United States Constitution, but it was
our constitution’’ (Nuestra Familia, Our Familia 2007). It designates a four-
level hierarchy: a General, Captains, Lieutenants, and Soldiers (see Figure 1).
Originally, one General governed the incarcerated members. He commanded
up to 10 captains, who usually resided in different prison facilities. Each Cap-
tain commanded Lieutenants and Soldiers in their respective correctional
facilities.6
5. In addition to the organizational structure, other attributes of the gang reﬂect the military
background of its founders. For example, all NF members are required to participate daily in the
synchronized work out regiment known as La Machina (The Machine).
6. A written constitution or by-laws are not uncommon among criminal gangs. Jankowski ﬁnds
that out of the 37 street gangs he studied, 22 had some form of written codes regulating members’
behavior, some of which were speciﬁcally designed to prevent internal predation (1991: 78–82).
There is limited evidence about the internal rules of other prison gangs, but the available evidence
does suggest functional similarities to the NF organization. The Gangster Disciples, for example,
have internal rules for their incarcerated members that prohibits theft or destruction of other
members’ property, arguments during sports activities, and exploitation of other members (Knox
and Fuller 2004: 20). It appears that NF is not unique in their governance institutions. The orga-
nization is uniquely informative, though, because of the level of detail provided in their consti-
tution and the availability of multiple sources of evidence about it.
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NF proﬁts from a variety of illegal activities. Their incarcerated members
proﬁt from dealing drugs, extortion, robbery, illegal gambling, racketeering,
and smuggling contraband (California Department of Justice 2003: 15). NF
documents obtained by the FBI, for example, indicate that one inmate sold
methamphetamine narcotics for 200 to 300 dollars per ounce in the main prison
cellblock (Fuentes 2006: 242). Outside of prison, the main source of income
for NF comes from the proceeds derived from distributing drugs, armed rob-
beries, burglaries, and home invasion robberies (California Department of
Justice 2004: 9). According to one long-time NF member, membership ‘‘gives
you more power, more knowledge, insight and protection’’ (Fuentes 2006: 262).
Figure 1. Original Organizational Form of La Nuestra Familia.
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As a Grand Jury indictment indicates, the membership conﬁrmation process
is elaborate:
Usually membership was approved only after a period of indoctrination
by Nuestra Familia members in which prospects were schooled and then
tested. . . about Nuestra Familia criminal activities, including the man-
ufacture of prison weapons, or ‘‘shanks,’’ and the commission of murder,
robbery and drug dealing inside and outside of prison. Only those who
evinced both a knowledge of, and willingness to participate in, these
activities were eligible for membership. This perpetration of violence
and other crimes was ordinarily a prerequisite to membership in the or-
ganization, and membership, once achieved, was for life, as symbolized
by the organization’s membership phrase, blood in, blood out. (Fuentes
2006: 296).
Members have to spill the blood of an enemy to join, and the only way for most
members to leave the gang is death.7 Once inmates join NF, all members swear
allegiance to the organization and its constitution.
In general, inmates do not have the option of joining any prison gang they
wish to, and many inmates choose not to join a gang at all. Prison gang mem-
bership is conﬁned primarily to individuals of a particular race, and some
gangs require that an inmate be from a particular geographic region. Nearly
all individuals in NF are of ‘‘Latin extraction’’ and from Northern California.
Other Hispanic prison gangs, such as the Southern California–based Mexican
Maﬁa, rarely allow Northern California Hispanics to join. These requirements
result in prison gangs with some monopsony power.
Restricting access to particular ethnicities and geographic regions yields
several beneﬁts, primarily from homogeneity among members. Homogeneous
members who share similar socio-economic and cultural background have
lower communication costs.8 After release, NF members can more easily mon-
itor each other and ensure fulﬁllment of gang responsibilities. Geographic
proximity and social connections lower the costs of obtaining information
while recruiting potential members. Members who violate the gang’s rules
can less easily return to familiar communities to take advantage of family ties
and the social capital accumulated in legal and illegal occupations (Putnam
2000). This increases the relative cost of deserting or betraying the gang.
7. Many prison gangs require lifetime commitments. Several factors suggest this requirement is
efﬁcient. Lifetime membership reduces communication costs because there is less risk of members
informing law enforcement or rival criminal organizations about sensitive material after they leave
the gang. Lifetimemembership allows the organization to internalize the beneﬁts from investments
in members’ human capital. A gang’s reputation can reduce the costs of engaging in business, and
if members are allowed to leave the gang, it may be more difﬁcult to maintain their reputation
because other inmates are unsure of who is a member.
8. Abe (1983) discusses the different cultural perceptions of what constitutes effective com-
munication; a related economics literature examines the effects of social distance (e.g., social
class) on interactions (Akerlof 1997).
Putting the ‘‘con’’ into Constitutions 189
 by guest on July 23, 2014
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The absence of multiethnic gangs suggests the beneﬁts from homogeneity are
substantial.9 Homogeneity of agents complements the mechanisms outlined
below in limiting internal predation.
From the organization’s point of view, equilibriummembership size obtains
when the marginal beneﬁt that the organization’s members receive from ad-
ditional members are equal to the marginal cost incurred. Group members ben-
eﬁt from the accrual of proﬁts from illicit activities by incarcerated and paroled
members. Additionally, incarcerated members increase the gang’s ability to
engage in warfare with other prison gangs and prison ofﬁcials.
There are several costs to the organization from accepting additional
members. First, because the organization engages in illegal activities, there is
potential for members to inform authorities about their activities. Second, con-
spiracy laws make each co-conspirator in NF responsible for reasonably fore-
seeable crimes committed by all othermembers (Pinkertonv.United States, 328
U.S. 640 [1946]). Third, members receive protection in prison and access to the
organization’s resources.Last,members’behavioraffects thegang’s reputation,
so allowing low-quality members to join can reduce the average quality of the
gang in other inmates’ eyes. NF will accept new members when the expected
beneﬁt exceeds these expected costs.
The NF leadership weighs the beneﬁts and costs from allowing additional
members to join. Prison gangs limit membership by race, location, and region,
so they have monopsony power in hiring inputs, and competition among prison
gangs for members is not a sufﬁcient check against internal predation. More-
over, enabling certain individuals with the power to coerce autonomously is
actually a productive input into the organization’s production. Competition
will not remove the potential for predation, so how can potential members gain
assurances that they will not be predated?
3. The Prisoner’s Other Dilemma
3.1. Overview
An individual inmate faces the problem of how to remain safe while in prison.
Sometimes the solution is to join a gang. A prison gang can protect the indi-
vidual from other inmates and other prison gangs; however, in Madisonian
fashion, a gang strong enough to protect an inmate is also strong enough to
predate upon him.
Following Bowker (1980), I deﬁne predation broadly as including not just
physical abuse, but psychological, economic, and social victimization. This
includes speciﬁc acts such as extortion, rape, theft, pimping, and forcing some-
one to hold contraband or violate other correctional facility rules. More gen-
erally, though, all members bear the costs of the choices made by gang leaders.
Members will suffer if their leaders recklessly order them to risk their lives or
9. At times, gangs do make exceptions to these requirements. The NF constitution states
‘‘. . . other extractions (races) will be considered with the consent of both the captain and NG’’
(Art. 5, Sec. 4) These exceptions do prove the rule, but the absence of multiethnic prison gangs sug-
gests the advantages from limiting membership by race and geographic origin outweigh the costs.
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command them to do so for personal reasons. Like all gangs, the gang’s rep-
utation and activities reﬂect on its individual members. For example, if the
leadership starts a war that creates new enemies, each member of the gang
now has a new enemy, whether he wants one or not. Limiting these costs—
direct predation and the negative externality of bad decisions by superiors—
requires overcoming a collective action problem.
The potential for predation leads to two problems for the criminal
organization. First, given that potential entrants have imperfect information
about the costs and beneﬁts of membership, how does NF ensure his protection
before joining the organization? The original NF constitution grants the
Nuestro General ‘‘supreme authority,’’ membership is for life, and members
must work for the gang even once released. Since exit is not an option, the
potential for predation is especially strong.10 Second, how does the organiza-
tion control internal predation? If NF gets a reputation of predating its own
members, the expected beneﬁt of membership will decline, making it more
difﬁcult to recruit people. Current members will also expend resources to
protect themselves from internal predation instead of engaging in business.
The Nuestro General, Captain, and Lieutenant can each gain individually
by predating on underlings because the costs are borne by all members of
the organization. For the gang to be successful, it must overcome the collective
action problem of limiting predation.
3.2. A Simple Model of Predation
Consider a sequential game of complete and perfect information (Figure 2)
between an inmate who will potentially join the gang (Player 1) and a member
with authority over other members (Player 2). Player 1 ranks payoffs as a > b
> c > d; Player 2 ranks payoffs as g > h > j > k.
Initially, Player 1 and 2 each have two options. Player 1 can either join or not
join the gang.11 Player 2 can either predate or not predate on Player 1.12 Player
1 chooses ﬁrst (at node indicated P1) and Player 2 chooses second (at nodes
indicated P2).
If Player 1 decides not to join NF, he is reliant on himself for protection and
he is not bound to obey the gang. If Player 2 chooses not to predate him, Player
10. The NF constitution indicates that members might be ‘‘discharged’’ from the organization.
This results either when a member is declared a traitor or upon semi-retirement, when a member
who is ﬁfty years old and has been in the organization for twenty years can choose to be assigned
only to legal activities.
11. The model does assume that people can voluntarily choose – no one is forced to join the
gang. While it is possible that prison gangs could attempt to force people to join, there is no ev-
idence to suggest they actually do. In fact, the elaborate schooling and testing process prior to
initiation suggests that NF is selective in choosing its membership. If, however, an individual
was forced to join the gang and the internal governance rules applied to him, the governance insti-
tutions would still protect the individual from internal predation to the same extent that it protects
willing participants.
12. For simplicity, I assume that all predation attempts are successful.
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1’s payoff is a. If, on the other hand, Player 2 does decide to predate on him by
acts of theft, rape, abuse, etc., Player 1 receives a payoff of c, with c < a . In
either case, Player 1 faces only direct predation and does not bear the costs of
the organization’s decisions more broadly.
When Player 1 joins NF and is not predated, he enjoys the beneﬁts of pro-
tection from other gangs as well as assistance in operating criminal enterprises
inside and outside of prison. For this, he receives a payoff of b.13
There are potential costs to joining the gang though. Obedience to superiors
inside the prison and the potential for predation by them are the most apparent.
Other costs include the responsibilities of members once paroled. Parolees
must pay a ‘‘gang tax’’ of 25% of their earnings for the rest of their lives
to higher-ranking members inside and outside of prison (California Depart-
ment of Justice. 2004: 9).14 Members are subject to the gang’s direction; they
Figure 2. The Predation Problem.
13. Perhaps because their legal opportunities are preferred to criminal ones, for some inmates
joining the gang will always be less preferred than not joining, as evidenced by the many inmates
who do not join gangs. This analysis focuses on those inmates who do value gang membership
conditionally.
14. The 25% tax is not predation because members know about it and agree to it before joining
the gang.
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cannot continue their criminal activities autonomously. A United States Dis-
trict Court reports that one particular NF murder was motivated because
a member ‘‘. . . was classed as a ‘‘dropout’’ for refusing to carry out his gang
responsibilities while imprisoned at Deuel Vocational Institute’’ and so ‘‘was
on the gang’s hit list’’ (Vasquez v. McGrath). Failure to engage actively in
criminal enterprise once released is punishable by death (Lynem 1999). Life-
time commitment to NF comes at a signiﬁcant cost. Given these costs, Player 1
especially dislikes predation once a member, so this yields a payoff to Player 1
of d, with d < c.
Player 2 beneﬁts from an additional soldier in the organization, which yields
a payoff of h. However, Player 2 can gain additional beneﬁts from predating
Player 1 once he has joined. The payoff from predating a member is g, with
g > h. If Player 1 chooses not to join, then Player 2 can still choose to either
Predate or Not Predate. By predating, Player 2 can earn some amount, a payoff
of j. This is less valued than h because Player 1’s wealth is limited to what he
alone can earn without the organization’s assistance.15 The payoff to Player 2
if he does not predate is k.
The result is that for Player 2, predation is strictly dominant. Given this,
Player 1 will choose not to join because c is greater than d. The subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium is (Don’t Join, Predate) with a social payoff of (c þ j).
Mutually beneﬁcial exchanges do not take place.16 If the NF organization
could credibly commit not to predate on the potential entrant once he joins,
then Player 1 would choose to Join. When Player 2 credibly commits and does
not predate, Player 1 receives b, which is greater than c and Player 2 receives h,
which is greater than j. All players are better off.
3.3. Constitutional Constraint on Predation
The NF constitution is an attempt to commit credibly to the protection of its
members. However, the fact that a constitution is in place does not make it
binding. Due to the problems Sutter (1997) identiﬁes, collective action prob-
lems arise among the current leaders. Each NF leader has an incentive to pre-
date on members even though they would all be better off if no one did.
Internal predation makes recruiting new members more difﬁcult and encour-
ages members to invest resources in preventing predation rather than engaging
in their criminal enterprise. How can the Nuestro General ensure that Captains
and Lieutenants do not predate on members? The constitution creates multi-
level internal governance institutions that limit predation by enabling members
to monitor for predation, an incentive to stop it, and a mechanism for doing so.
The result is that Player 1 can now act subsequent to Player 2’s move. The NF
15. There are two reasons why gang members would choose to predate on their own member-
ship. First, gang members will generally have more resources to extract. Second, nongang member
inmates are often customers of the gang’s businesses.
16. Society as a whole may be better off if these individuals did not cooperate, but this model
considers only the welfare of these particular inmates. See Buchanan (1999) for an argument in
defense of organized crime.
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constitution has empowered him to resist predation by giving him amechanism
for communicating abuse to superiors. Player 1 can now ‘‘enforce’’ the con-
stitution and stop predation or not (see Figure 3).17 Given the mechanisms
explicitly outlined in the constitution (see below), ‘‘enforce’’ is the dominant
strategy for Player 1 when Player 2 predates. Because Player 2 knows Player 1
will enforce the constitution, Player 2 will not predate and Player 1 will join.
When Player 1 had no ability to stop predation, the social payoff was (c þ j).
With the constitution in place, however, the equilibrium will be (Join, Don’t
Predate, Don’t Enforce) and the social payoff will be (b þ h). All parties are
better off than if Player 1 had chosen not to join.
4. A Constitution for the Incarcerated
4.1. Overview
How does the constitution provide checks and balances to ensure that Player 1
can effectively enforce the constitution when Player 2 predates? Enforcing
constitutional constraint becomes difﬁcult because of the collective action
Figure 3. Constitutional Constraints on the Predation Problem.
17. I assume that information costs are low enough to identify who is actually in the organi-
zation and thus subject to the constitution. Player 1 cannot enforce the constitution if he is not
a member of the gang.
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problems that arise from the hierarchical governance structure. There are sev-
eral advantages to a hierarchical system. The most important advantage is that
it avoids the costs of obtaining information about all activities occurring in the
different prisons. Information about members (skills, attitude, dependability,
etc.), correctional ofﬁcers (hard-nosed, lax, weaknesses in particular facility
operations, etc.), the inmate consumer population (preferences for drugs, pros-
titution, etc.), and other gangs (power, market control, belligerence, etc.) are
all more easily obtained by individuals within that particular prison.
Communication is costly since correctional ofﬁcials are continually
attempting to intercept communication between gang members. NF use of
the Aztec language, ‘‘micro writing’’ of letters less than a quarter of an inch,
codes and ciphers, messages hidden in artwork, and relaying lengthy messages
via paroled members are several costly methods resorted to. Citing an Asso-
ciated Press article, Fuentes notes that some resourceful inmates ‘‘are taught to
write coded messages with their own urine on the backs of innocent-looking
letters or drawings before mailing them to outsiders. When the urine dries, the
contents of the message remain invisible to the naked eye until the recipient
holds the paper to heat and its secrets are revealed’’ (Fuentes 2006: 93). Vest-
ing decision-making authority with individual Captains allows the organiza-
tion to obviate high communication costs.
An alternative organizational structure would be rule by consensus rather
than giving supreme authority to the General. Several reasons suggest this
is less effective. First, coordinating activity across different prison facilities
would be prohibitively expensive if there was to be total (or even partial) group
consensus on all decisions. As the number of people it takes to reach agreement
rises, the costs of decision will rise as well (Buchanan and Tullock 1999: 71).
Grann (2004) quotes a member of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang on the
importance of decision-making costs:
We used to be one man one vote, included damn near everything. I mean,
damn near everything. Somebody getting in, whacking somebody . . .
You damn near had to have the whole state’s okay . . ..You had to send
some kites [notes] and runners and lawyers and this and that. It always
got tipped off by the time we got back to you and said, Yeah, dump the
guy. . . .You can’t have someone in the yard that you want to bump [kill]
and let them be out there for two or three weeks.’’
Giving power to leaders reduces these decision-making costs.
Second, decisiveness and unquestioning obedience by subordinates is cru-
cial in times of war. If someone becomes a ‘‘weak link’’ during an attack be-
cause of confusion about who is in authority or whether the attack was
authorized by the requisite parties, the initiative may be undermined and
all members endangered. In this case, the clearly deﬁned prerogative to com-
mand and coerce members is an important input into the gang’s operation.
Of course, a hierarchical structure has weaknesses too. Principle-agent prob-
lems are present because of the autonomy of regiments and the costly nature of
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communication between prisons. The General may not know what a Captain is
doing in another prison. Is the Captain embezzling funds, making foolish over-
tures to rival gangs, or snitching to correctional ofﬁcials?
The NF constitution creates a system of checks and balances to protect
against predation (see Figure 4). Predation mainly can occur against lower
ranking members; for example, the General could predate on Captains or Cap-
tains on Lieutenants or Soldiers. The General, however, can also be predated
through illegitimate deposition. As predation increases, the proﬁtability of the
operation as a whole declines. Potential members are less likely to join for lack
of a credible commitment for their safety. Members spend resources protecting
themselves against predation from within rather than earning in their criminal
enterprises.
The governance structure adopted provides several mechanisms for NF
leaders to reduce the costs associated with the problems of constitutional con-
straint that Sutter identiﬁes.18 First, the constitution vests mechanisms for
monitoring with those members who have the lowest costs of monitoring.
For example, a Soldier can observe the activities of a Captain more easily than
other Captains can because they are in the same correctional facility. Soldiers
have speciﬁc knowledge about the time and place of superiors’ actions that are
not available to other Captains or the General.
Second, members have an incentive to communicate information about pre-
dation to superiors; this overcomes the free rider problem. If a Soldier is treated
inappropriately, appealing to a higher ranked member can improve his situ-
ation. More broadly, aligning incentives between the General and lower
ranked members discourages predation by Captains and Lieutenants. For ex-
ample, the General wants his organization to be prepared in the case of war;
Soldiers, too, want personal safety if war is declared. By requiring the Lieu-
tenants to provide weapons to each Soldier, the Soldiers and General’s incen-
tives are now aligned. If the Soldier does not receive his weapons, he has both
the information and incentive to communicate this information to superiors.
Third, information and incentives are useless if members do not have mech-
anisms for reporting predation. The constitution creates several mechanisms—
voting and appeals processes—designed for this purpose. By aligning incentives
to monitor predation with the lowest-cost observers and providing mechanisms
for communicating this information to the individuals in charge, NF can credibly
commit not to predate on its members.
4.2. Nuestro General
Originally, the governance structure had four ranks outlined in the constitu-
tion: the Nuestro General, Captains, Lieutenants, and Soldiers (see Figure 1).
The Nuestro General is ‘‘the supreme power in the organization . . . his powers
18. The NF constitution does not appear to address Sutter’s second problem of enforcing con-
stitutional constraint: ensuring the sincerity of constitutional interpretation by experts. It is unclear
if this is because the constitution is clear enough to obtain agreement on its meaning, if this role is
facilitated in some unknown way, or if this concern in not applicable in this setting.
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shall have no limit’’ (Art. 1, §1).19 He has the authority to command any mem-
ber, determine the enterprise’s strategy, and declare war on other prison gangs
or against correctional ofﬁcers. A Salinas Police interview with an NF member
corroborates this role, reporting that, ‘‘Ramirez [a paroled NF member] stated
that the new order contains a general on the inside who runs everything within
the prison system . . .’’ (NuestraFamiliaOurFamily.org: 2). The Nuestro Gen-
eral remains in power until he is within 1 year of completing his prison sen-
tence (Art. 1, Sec. 2) or becomes physically incapable of completing his
responsibilities, at which time the chosen successor takes control.
Figure 4. Checks and Balances.
19. Citations to article and section numbers correspond to the gang’s written constitution.
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How can gang members restrain the power of the General? Nominally, the
General has ‘‘supreme power,’’ but his ability to predate is actually limited in
several ways. First, the General is constrained in times of peace. The General
can appoint and discharge Captains at his discretion in times of war, but during
times of peace, he can only discharge them. At that point, the regiment under
the previous Captain’s control will elect a new Captain to represent their inter-
ests and monitor the General.
The General has an incentive to limit wars, for these are times of reduced
proﬁtability. When prison gangs attack each other, correctional facilities will
lock down entire cellblocks, leading to foregone sales opportunities. OneAryan
Brotherhood member conﬁrms that wars translate into lower proﬁts: ‘‘We
weren’t looking to have wars . . . it would slow business down’’ (Gangland
2007).Prisonwars are costly: gangmembersmaybe injured,placed into isolated
cells where they cannot conduct business, and resourcesmust be used to protect
against rival gang attacks. As proﬁts diminish, the General’s coffers do too.
The second way the General is constrained is by impeachment. The General
may be impeached from ofﬁce by signatures from all of the Captains (Art. 1A,
Sec. 1). He loses all power immediately upon receipt of the document. He may
challenge the legality of the signatures, in which case a Soldier will be assigned
to verify the Captains’ votes (Art. 1A, Sec. 2). Once the General is impeached,
the ﬁrst-ranked Captain will succeed the General. The ﬁrst-ranked Captain has
an incentive to monitor predation by the General and a mechanism for stopping
predation when all 10 captains ﬁnd it onerous.
How does the General know he will be safe from unauthorized deposition?
Historically, dictators and kings have faced the threat of coups by self-seeking
successors; the General faces this problem as well.20 Several checks and bal-
ances protect against this. First, if the General feels a Captain is not following
the constitution or is a threat to him, he can discharge the Captain. Discharging
a Captain does not ensure that someone more compliant will be elected, how-
ever, because the Captains are elected by the regimental membership body.
Second, if the General is injured or killed, war is declared immediately. This
raises the cost of overthrowing the General because if the coup fails he can
appoint Captains at will during times of war rather than having to accept
whomever the members elect. Third, the Captain responsible for protecting
the General ‘‘will have no power to appoint or replace any or all positions
in the high command’’ (Art. 1, Sec. 3a), and he will be stripped of all rank
after the war is over (Art. 3, Sec. 12). The Captain charged with protecting
the General has the incentive to do so. Finally, the General chooses who among
the Captains will be his successor. The successor must be a ‘‘seasoned expe-
rienced warrior’’ (Art. 1, Sec. 3). This creates an incentive for the chosen suc-
cessor to monitor the other Captains. Because he is next in line to be the
General, he has an incentive to ensure that depositions are orderly. In the event
of a coup, he may not receive his rightful position.
20. See Tullock (2005), for an extensive discussion of the incentives facing dictators, espe-
cially pages 48–81.
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Despite the restraints on the General’s power, the NF membership eventu-
ally found it insufﬁcient. By 1978, 13 years after its inception, NF had accu-
mulated tens of thousands of dollars of illegal revenue. Robert Sosa, the
Nuestro General, controlled the organization’s reserves, which gave ﬁnancial
assistance to parolees and provided comfort items like TVs to reincarcerated
members. Members discovered that Sosa was responsible for embezzling over
$100,000 from the organization’s bank. He denied ‘‘any wrong doing and re-
fused to relinquish any ﬁnancial records. Believing that something should be
done, NF members charged Sosa with misappropriating NF funds and
impeached him’’ (Fuentes 2006: 28). Sosa refused to step down, so NF mem-
bers ‘‘hit him’’ (Fuentes 2006: 28). This was considered acceptable enforce-
ment of constitutional abuses. Surprisingly, Sosa survived the attack, but he
was no longer a member of NF, and he remained on the gang’s hit list.
More cautious of giving control to a single person, the NFmembership rede-
ﬁned the highest rank as the ‘‘Organizational Governing Body’’ (OGB),
a three-member board (Fuentes 2006: 29). The three members were ‘‘voted
into their leadership positions, receiving equal yet limited authority’’ (Fuentes
2006: 29). Members of the OGB had the same authority that the General did,
but all decisions had to receive two-thirds support. Members of the OGB could
be voted out by agreement of three-fourths of the Captains. The revised con-
stitution stated that the OGB should ‘‘respectfully guide the directives and
honor the will of the people.’’21
4.3. Captains
Captains monitor the OGB but they also have power to coerce Lieutenants and
Soldiers. It is the Captain’s duty to command them in pursuit of the organi-
zation’s objectives. Selling drugs, extortion, and prostitution are common ac-
tivities. The Captain is also in charge of determining discipline for all minor
infractions within his regiment (Art. 6, Sec. 1). The NF organization can have
up to 10 Captains (also known as Commanders or Capita´ns) at a time (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 2008: 7).
How are Captains constrained in using this power to the detriment of the
organization? Several mechanisms accomplish this. First, the OGB ranks
the Captains ‘‘according to their leadership ability and overall foresight’’
(Art. 1, Sec. 7). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, rank is
obtained by ‘‘making good hits [murders] on hermits [enemies of NF]’’
(2008: 7). Members elected to the OGB ‘‘must have already made the ultimate
sacriﬁce [murder] for the O [organization] and can have no less than ten (10)
years of loyal membership’’ (Fuentes 2006: 30), so the potential for promotion
motivates Captains to constrain their predation.
21. When the original constitution was amended to replace the Nuestro General with the OGB,
the titles of the other ranks were changed as well. Categories I, II, and III replaced soldiers, lieu-
tenants, and captains. Because the change was semantic, I will continue to use the original rank
titles for clarity.
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Unlike the OGB, the Captain appoints Lieutenants to be under his charge.
There is no requirement on the number of Lieutenants to be under a Captain,
and he is free to dismiss them at will. This freedom enables Captains to order
Lieutenants to engage in activities that are costly for the organization. This
power is constrained in three ways. First, during times of peace discharged
Lieutenants can petition the OGB to complain about unfair demotion (Art. 3,
Sec. 2). The OGB is required to send no less than three soldiers to investigate
the matter. They can discipline the Captain or reinstate the Lieutenants if de-
sired. Second, if a Lieutenant is disciplined by a Captain unfairly he can appeal
to the OGB (Art. 6, Sec. 1), although not in times of war. Third, Captains are
always answerable to the OGB (Art. 3, Sec. 10). If there are a sufﬁcient number
of complaints about a Captain, the OGB can discharge him and the members of
the regiment will elect a new one.
Following these constitutional constraints appears to be common among the
membership. For example, in 1993 a conﬂict arose between two captains. Ar-
thur ‘‘Big Smiley’’ Ramirez asserted authority over prerogatives held by Pablo
‘‘Pantera’’ Pena. Pena ‘‘ﬁled a complaint to the Regimental Security Depart-
ment (RSD) ofﬁcer, Gerald ‘‘Cuete’’ Rubalcaba, . . . about Big Smiley’s un-
authorized attempt to take over the high command of D-facility’’ (Fuentes
2006: 118). Rubalcaba obtained information about misconduct because the
person being challenged, Pena, had both the incentive to and a mechanism
for reporting it. Rather than costly physical inﬁghting to resolve the dispute,
the internal mechanisms outlined in the constitution were relied upon.
In another instance, Ramirez was investigated for recruiting members with-
out authorization (Fuentes 2006: 168). Pena, aware of Ramirez’s constitutional
violations stated that ‘‘We’ve impeached other familianos in the past . . . and
we will do it again.’’ He felt it would be a ‘‘serious mistake’’ to allow any
member to act as if he were a ‘‘dictator’’ (Fuentes 2006: 166). Pena ‘‘as a fam-
iliano, was long since wedded to participatory democracy in substance as well
as in form’’ (Fuentes 2006: 167). As punishment for breaking the rules,
Ramirez was demoted to the rank of Soldier, where he held no leadership au-
thority (Fuentes 2006: 174).
In addition to corroborating the conﬂict and resolution between Pena and
Ramirez, transcripts from an FBI interview with Robert Gratton (at one time
the third highest ranking member of NF) conﬁrms that problems reported to
superiors in this situation are ‘‘investigated and those who are found in vio-
lation of NF rules [are] held accountable’’(Fuentes 2006: 238).
In general, evidence suggests that captains followed the constitution. For
example, the constitution states that the highest ranking captain in a correc-
tional facility is in charge of the gang regiment, and although this may entail
one captain having less authority when a higher ranked captain arrives in his
prison, it appears that this protocol was followed. In one case, a higher ranking
paroled member took leadership of a regiment, which entailed the peaceful
demotion of the current leader to the role of advisor (Fuentes 2006: 122).
In another case, ‘‘. . . although Gratton was the higher-ranking member, he
knew his stay in Deuel was temporary and decided to function as a regimental
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advisor instead of taking the reigns of power’’ (Fuentes 2006: 135). One cap-
tain was demoted for not enforcing discipline in his regiment strictly enough,
being replaced by a captain who would (Reynolds 2008). Another incident
involved a captain being demoted for not murdering an enemy of the organi-
zation (Fuentes 2006: 191). They transferred power peacefully, following the
dictates of the constitution, and avoided costly warring within the group.
This evidence should be viewed with caution, as it does not indicate the
frequency that individuals followed the constitution. These may be the few
rare occurrences where the constitution was followed. However, given the im-
portance of the constitution as outlined in private correspondence between
members (Fuentes 2006: 176, 186) the existence of these examples, and
the authenticity granted by the FBI to its importance, it is likely that the con-
stitution is followed to a signiﬁcant extent.
4.4. Lieutenants and Soldiers
The Lieutenant’s job is to be the representative of the organization and work
directly with Soldiers. The Lieutenants are ranked based on their Captain’s
estimation of their experience and leadership ability (Art. 4, Sec. 4). The Lieu-
tenant’s operational duties include keeping in touch with all members of the
regiment, and at all times setting a good example for the Soldiers to follow
(Art. 4, Sec. 1). He is responsible for Soldiers’ ‘‘schooling and basic needs
and conduct’’ (Art. 4, Sec. 3):
All recruits must master the rules, which are taught in an atmosphere
a high-school teacher might envy. ‘‘They drilled us eight hours
a day,’’ says Art Serrato, another apostate. ‘‘It was brainwashing.’’
The classes are divided between academic discussions of drug rings,
armed robberies and the gang’s constitution, and workshops, where lieu-
tenants teach how to make bombs from matches, knives from cologne
bottles and zip guns from toothpaste tubes (Sandza and Shannon 1982).
In addition, Lieutenants administer discipline as directed by the regiment’s
Captain (Art. 6, Sec. 2).
Lieutenants also keep records, known as the Bad News List, of all enemies of
NF, and they check the prisoner transfer list daily to see if any of these enemies
have entered the facility (Art. 4, Sec. 5). If so, they will arrange for the inmate’s
murder. Court transcripts indicate, ‘‘Every lieutenant in Nuestra Familia was re-
sponsible for see(ing) to it that something was done about the people on the list.
The higher-ups schooled their subordinates as to the identity of the gang’s en-
emies and a lieutenant could, on his own initiative, order his soldiers to execute
a known enemy of the Nuestra Familia’’ (People v. Garnica, 175 Cal. Rptr. 521,
522–23 [5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981]). Lieutenants also talk with all new NF mem-
bers to ﬁnd out about unknown enemies of Nuestra Familia (Art. 4, Sec. 5a).
Given his role of managing soldiers and his discretion to murder, what pre-
vents the Lieutenants from predating on their own soldiers? Reminiscent of the
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United States Constitution’s 2nd Amendment, one of the Lieutenant’s duties is
to ensure that every Soldier is armed (Art. 4, Sec. 2). This ensures that each
member has a degree of personal safety from both predating lieutenants and
other inmates. If in peacetime a member ‘‘feels that the power or powers of the
structure in his regiment is mis-using their appointed authority against him
. . .’’ they can appeal to the OGB to investigate the matter (Art. 3, Sec. 10).
Soldiers can check the power of Lieutenants and Captains by appeal to the
OGB. When a Soldier goes into combat, the Lieutenant has to report it to
the Captain (Art. 4, Sec. 3a). As a result, a Lieutenant cannot use soldiers
for purposes outside of NF goals. These mechanisms provide greater safety
to soldiers.
The constitution also improves the collective pursuit of criminal proﬁts by
raising the costs of alternative, nongang activities, and prohibiting behavior
that negatively affect other members. No material things, ‘‘whether it be drugs,
money, women’’ can be placed before the best interest of the organization (Art.
6, Sec. 5). Fighting other members is forbidden ‘‘. . . and if blood is spilled, it
will result in the expulsion of one or all parties involved’’ (Art. 6, Sec. 4).
Because communication is costly and the leaders have signiﬁcant authority
to coerce, members are prohibited from lying to each other about their position
or gang business (Art. 6, Sec. 5a). NF requires an ‘‘automatic death sentence
. . . on familianos that turns coward, traitor or deserter’’ (Art. 2, Sec. 5). This
increases the relative cost of engaging in crimes independently, giving up the
life of crime, or shirking on one’s NF responsibilities, thus strengthening the
organizations criminal exploits.
5. Conclusion
Despite being a murderous prison gang, NF has taken active and rational steps
toward promoting effective internal governance institutions. This article has
shown how predation within the organization is limited through a system of
checks and balances. As constructed, the internal governance institutions en-
able each member with the ability to monitor predation, an incentive to stop it,
and a mechanism for doing so.
Extensive norms of social and professional interaction are central to
prison gangs and organized crime more generally. The recent arrest of a Sicil-
ian Maﬁa crime boss revealed that the organization has a ‘‘Ten Command-
ments’’ that dictates acceptable behavior and norms that all members are
required to follow (Lubrano 2007). Polish prisoners in the 1980’s developed
extensive unwritten rules about appropriate behavior in order to overcome
problems arising from the scarcity of physical space and breathing room
(Kaminski 2004).
NF’s system of checks and balances allows it to overcome the problem of
predation given their hierarchical governance structure. Other organized crime
enterprises, however, face different constraints that determine different gov-
ernance institutions that engender different predation problems. The potential
for predation permeates criminal activity but are especially problematic when
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organizations are characterized by the inability for members to exit. Solving
this fundamental problem of organized crime is crucial to the successful
organization of criminal enterprise.
For example, Leeson (2007a) examines internal predation and governance
between two groups—predating pirate captains and pirate sailors faced with
a coordination problem to enforce restraint. This two-tier organizational
structure is efﬁcient because information costs about members’ activity
are low given the relatively small number of pirates and the circumscribed
space on a ship (Leeson 2007a: 1057). The beneﬁts from reducing informa-
tion costs by delegating authority were apparently less than the costs of am-
biguity of leadership in times of battle. Because of this organizational
structure, a coordination problem arose among the potential victims who
were able to identify predation when it occurred but could not coordinate
enforcement.
To solve the coordination problem, sailors employed a quartermaster to
monitor the captain and coordinate constitutional enforcement. Both the cap-
tain and quartermaster were elected by majority vote and all pirates agreed to
the ship’s rules before setting sail. In times of battle, the captain had full au-
thority on the ship, but at other times, the quartermaster was responsible for
handing out rations and resolving disputes—an effective check on the cap-
tain’s power to predate (Leeson 2007a: 1064–76).
Both NF and 18th century pirates faced the problem of internal predation,
but the predation problem took different forms. Limiting predation within pris-
ons was a collective action problem of overcoming agency problems and high
communication costs, while the pirates were faced with a coordination prob-
lem. Both deployed constitutions, though with different rules, to construct
mechanisms for solving these problems within the governance institutions.
The methodical nature of the NF constitution may seem surprising at ﬁrst. It
should be recognized, however, that criminal enterprises face many of the
same problems that governments do, so it is not unexpected that similar sol-
utions are developed with adequate alteration for the uniqueness of the envi-
ronment. The mental capabilities of criminals, especially prison inmates, also
should not be underestimated. Writing about his own experience as an inmate
in a Polish prison, the political scientist Kaminski (2004) writes that:
Prisonsocializesaninmatetobehavehyperrationally.It teacheshimpatience
in planning and pursuing his goals, punishes him severely for his mistakes,
and rewards him generously for smart action . . .. There is little space for in-
nocent and spontaneous expressions of emotionwhen they collidewith fun-
damental interests . . .. Paradoxically, much of the confusion in interpreting
prison behavior arises from both a failure to understand the motives of
inmates and an unwillingness to admit that outcomes judged as inhuman
or bizarre may be consequences of individually rational action (2004: 1).
There may be no honor among thieves but by carefully designing their internal
governance institutions, criminal organizations can create order.
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Appendix: The Supreme Power Structure of NF22
Article 1: Supreme Commander
Section I. The Nuestro General (NG) is the supreme power in the organization
known as La Nuestra Familia. His power shall have no limit (within Art. I, II,
III). Solely he can declare war for the entire O and once in a state of war, peace
shall not prevail until the announcement from the NG.
Section II. NG will be automatically released from any duties and respon-
sibilities upon receiving a date of one year or less.
Section III. NG will be a seasoned experienced warrior. This qualiﬁcation
is mandatory in order to hold this high ofﬁce. When the time comes for the
NG to pick a successor, he will do so from the ranks of commanders at his
disposal.
Section III(a). In case of emergency and the NG is downed, the captain at the
pinta will take over and automatically declare war until the ﬁrst captain can
automatically assume the rank of NG. In this emergency, the home captain will
have no power to appoint or replace any or all positions in the high command
of La Nuestra Familia.
Section IV. NG has the power, in the state of war conditions (as regards to
structure), to appoint captains. In peace time, he will retain the power to dis-
charge any commander that is negligent in the functions of his position; however,
he will relinquish his power to appoint captains if the familia where the captain
has been discharged has no reserve captain to take command. The familia body of
said disposed captain will elect a successor.
Section IV(a). A discharged commander will lose his rank of captain and
said authority of that rank.
Section V. Only applies in time of peace [sic].
Section V(a). NG, upon receiving a complaint from one of his soldados that
the authority of which he is under is unjustly using their power over him due to
personal conﬂict, he (NG) will appoint a committee of no less than three sol-
dados from that particular clan to investigate said charges, and each is to report
to the NG.
Section VI. NG will always keep in touch with all familianos leaving to the
streets, until a branch in union of La Nuestra Familia is established.
Section VII. NG can have as many as ten (10) active commanders at one
time. He will grade them as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and so on according to their leader-
ship abilities and their overall foresight.
Section VIII. NG will appoint a ﬁrst captain or commander who will be his
successor, and if the NG becomes incommunicado, the ﬁrst captain of the NF
will have the responsibility to see that every captain of said O works and gov-
erns within this constitution.
Section IX. The successor only applies as far as the ﬁrst captain is con-
cerned. The NG has the right to select the ﬁrst captain.
22. This reprint of the original constitution is found in Fuentes (2006: 3–11).
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Article I(a). Discharge of All Duties from NG.
Section I. NG may be impeached from ofﬁce where it is the opinion of all
commanders holding ofﬁce at that time that he is not working in the best in-
terest of the organization. This can be derived from a petition or document with
signatures in each captain’s own writing.
Section II. Upon receiving the document, the NG will automatically lose all
power, but he may challenge the legality of the signatures, in which case a
soldado will be appointed by the body to write to the captains and verify their
votes.
Section III. Upon conﬁrmation of a discharge of the NG, he will lose all rank
and power, and the successor will move into that position.
Article II. Objectives and Bylaws of NF
Section I. The primary purpose and goals of this O is for the betterment of its
members and the building up of this O on the outside into a strong and self-
supporting familia.
Section II. All members will work solely for this objective and will put all
personal goals and feelings aside until said fulﬁllment is accomplished.
Section III. A familianos will not be released from his obligation toward the
O because he is released from prison but will work twice as hard to see that
a familia is established and works in hand with the O already established be-
hind the walls (pinta).
Section IV. A familianos will remain a member until death or otherwise
discharged from the O. He will always be subject to put the best interest
of the O ﬁrst and always above everything else, in prison or out.
Section V. An automatic death sentence will be put on a familianos that
turns coward, traitor, or deserter. Under no other circumstances will a brother
familiano be responsible for spilling the blood of another familiano. To do so
will be considered an act of treason.
Section VI. In order for (Art. II, Sec. V) to be invoked, the regimental gov-
erning body will hold a vote among themselves and pass sentence. Majority
rules. In the case of a tie vote, the decision will lie with the captain, and his
decision shall be ﬁnal.
Section VII. All present familianos in said O La Nuestra Familia acknowl-
edge said constitution upon reading it and will be held accountable for his
actions if said constitution is not followed.
Article III. Regimental Captains
Section I. A captain is the regimental commander of La Nuestra Familia and
holds the rank just below el NG. Their responsibilities are to lead and direct La
Familia regiments under his care to successfully accomplish the goals set forth
in (Art. I, Sec. V).
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Section II. For this purpose, he (captain) shall have the choice of selecting
his own lieutenants (tenientes) and shall have the power to dismiss the lieu-
tenant if he (captain) feels that they are not accepting or handling their respon-
sibilities of leadership. In times of peace, a dismissed lieutenant has the option
to invoke (Art. I, Sec. V).
Section III. Due to circumstances beyond our control, it may be that there
will be more than one captain in a regiment at the same time. If a captain is
transferred from a familia regiment to another where there is already a captain,
the captain with the highest rank will take command, and the others will be in
reserve according to their ranks.
Section IV(a). A captain will have a grade rating of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and so forth,
as (Art. III, Sec. III) can be invoked. Also, the lower the numbered rating, the
greater their authority. No captain can override or contradict the orders of
a higher ranking commander without direction of NF’s NG.
Section IV(b). All other captains in a regiment other than the governing
captain will be classiﬁed as reserves and will act as advisors, although they
will not have any powers as to the running of the regiment.
Section V. There shall never be more than ten (10) captains in the O at any
time. This includes reserves. If there are already ten captains in the O and
a regiment is without a captain or commander due to (Art. III, Sec. III),
the 1st lieutenant will run the familia (regiment) temporarily until a commander
arrives or there is an opening in the ranks of captain.
Section VI. The reserve captains will only take power if the governing one
is downed or discharged by the NG. It will be the duty of the governing com-
mander to take and show him the internal functions of the regiment in order
that the reserve captain will be qualiﬁed to govern the regiment if need
arrives.
Section VII. All captains will hold equal rank and therefore one cannot order
the other, except under (Art. III, Sec. III), or where the reserve captain is hin-
dering the rules and orders that the governing captain has set forth efﬁciently
running the familia (regiment). In that case, the reserve captain will cease to
interfere or he will be brought before the NG.
Section VIII. The reserve captain only has as much power as the governing
commander wants bestowed on him and not more. The familia body should at
all times know the structure of the reserve captain.
Section IX. In time of war, the captain is only answerable to the NG and no
soldado shall question the orders set forth by him personally or one of his
tenientes. To question said orders could be a treasonable act, as outlined in
(Art. I, II, Sec. V), depending on the seriousness of the offense, which will
lie with the captain to determine.
Section X. In time of peace, as in time of war, a captain is answerable to the
NG; however, in time of peace, if a familianos soldado feels that the power or
powers of the structure in the regiment is misusing their appointed authority
against him due to conﬂicting personalities, he has a right as an honorable
member of this O to appeal to the supreme commander NG, as per (Art. I,
Sec. V).
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Section XI. The commander shall be responsible for the welfare and lives of
the soldados under his command at all times, and there shall be no suicidal
missions ordered by a commander. A suicidal mission shall be translated
as an act where the soldado has no chance of survival.
Section XII. Home captain where NG has his headquarters shall be held
responsible if anything should happen to the NG. It will be the duty of the
captain to personally see that two of his best warriors be with the NGwhenever
possible. If the NG is downed, the captain will be stripped of all rank after the
state of war is over (Art. I, Sec. IIIa).
Article IV. Functions and Qualities of a Lieutenant
Section I. A lieutenant is third in the power ladder of La Nuestra Familia, he is
under the captain. He is the representative of La Nuestra Familia, as he will be
in contact with familianos at all times and, therefore, he should at all times set
a good example for the soldados to follow.
Section II (a). While in a state of war, and the arms quota drops below the
speciﬁed requirement, it shall be ﬁrst priority of the lieutenant to restore to
restore to par as outlined in (Art. V, Sec. II) [sic].
Section III. Each lieutenant shall have a certain number of soldados assigned
to him. He shall be responsible for their schooling and basic needs and conduct.
Section III(a). Whenever one or all his soldados goes into combat with any
of the enemies of La Nuestra Familia, he (lieutenant) shall present the captain
with a full report of what occurred.
Section IV. The lieutenants shall have ratings of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. This rat-
ing shall be given to them by the captain according to their experience and
leadership abilities.
Section V. It shall be the duties of the lieutenants to keep a record of all
known names and numbers of La Nuestra Familia. Each day, he shall check
all new arrivals who entered his territory against his record book and make
a report to his captain.
Section V(a). All lieutenants shall question all new familianos assigned to
him for information as to unknown enemies of La Nuestra Familia. New in-
formation shall go into the record book, and whenever one of his soldados is
transferred to another pinta, a copy of the record book shall be sent with the
soldado.
Section V(b). It shall be the responsibility of the lieutenant to inform the
captain of the departure of his soldados in order that the familia of the other
regiment can be informed.
Article V. Familiano Soldado
Section I. All requests for membership into this O shall be made to the captain.
Any member can make such a request for any individual providing such
requesting familiano is will to accept full responsibility for said individual.
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Section II. Final decision for membership shall not be made until 30 days
have elapsed from such a request, and the governing body of the regiment must
approve the request for any new membership.
Section III. No applicant will be considered for membership if he (applicant)
misrepresents his qualiﬁcations. Also, once a member and soldado misrepre-
sents his actions in battle for the beneﬁt of making his actions seem more val-
orous, he will be subject to be disqualiﬁed under (Art. II, Sec. Vb), a minor
offense, or (Art. I, Sec. V), expelled from the O, depending upon the circum-
stances and seriousness of the lie.
Section IV. Membership of this O shall be restricted only to those of Latin
extraction. No maximum or minimum shall be invoked by this constitution in
so far as membership in this O is concerned; however, such limitations may be
established by NG as to be necessary to maintain proper control, although
others of other extractions (races) will be considered with the consent of both
the captain and the NG.
Article VI. Discipline and Conduct
Section I. The regimental captains shall pass sentence for all minor infractions
of conduct. In time of war, there will be no appeal to NG.
Section II. Punishment shall be administered by the regimental lieutenant
(Art. IV, Sec. III) or by the regiment as a whole, when ordered by the familia
commander.
Section III. All familianos shall be subject to disciplinary action or imme-
diate expulsion from this O (Art. II, Sec. V). In the case of misconduct or be-
havior unbecoming of a member, said conditions shall prevail with regards to
the individual toward another member, the O as a whole, or his superiors.
Section IV. Under no conditions will there be ﬁghting between familianos.
To do so will bring on disciplinary action and if blood is spilled, it will result in
the expulsion of one or all parties involved (Art II, Sec. V).
Section V. No member of this O shall put material things, whether it be
drugs, money, women, or punks (as related to the pinta) before the best interest
of La Nuestra Familia or a familianos.
Section V(a). No familiano shall lie about his position in La Nuestra Familia
nor when discussing familianos business to a superior or a brother member.
There shall be no lying or giving false impressions.
Section VI. It is the sacred duty of a familianos guerrero to do battle for La
Nuestra Familia, and no soldado should feel that because he fought for his O
that he is entitled to special privileges. All that matters is that you as a guerrero
of La Nuestra Familia are living up to your responsibilities. Remember that
a true guerrero does not need to boast of his accomplishments.
Section VII. Under no circumstances is any of this constitution to be altered
without notiﬁcation of el NG and one-third of his captain’s staff, nor shall
a familiano or familianos regiment put their own interpretations upon said con-
stitution. It is to be read in its entirety. All sections that relate to one concept are
to be read as such.
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